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A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

ITALY MARCHES

A. BORGESE · S. W. HALPERIN · CLIFTON UTLEY

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ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

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ITALY MARCHES*

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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ITALY MARCHES

MR. UTLEY: On June 10, Mussolini declared war and promised, first, victory to his people, and thereafter a long period of peace to Italy, to Europe, and to the world. And on that same day President Roosevelt said: "The hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor."[1]

During these six days, supposedly, Italy has been marching. But where has she been marching? We just heard that the Italians claim they are reconnoitering on the French border. There is apparently no real intention of Italy to march anywhere immediately, is there, Halperin?

MR. HALPERIN: There doesn't seem to be. I think when Italy declared war on June 10, she did so without intending to launch a major attack against France immediately. It seems to me that her eye was focused more on the question of being "in at the kill" before France was knocked out.

MR. UTLEY: Being in *at* the kill and not being in *before* the kill.

MR. HALPERIN: Exactly! And also I think she was interested in dealing a deadly blow to French morale, and in preparing for future action in Africa.

MR. BORGESE: I think that many think it is a phony war, but I cannot forget that many people thought it was a phony war

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[1] *Mussolini spoke from the Palazzo Venezia in Rome; Roosevelt, at the commencement exercises of the University of Virginia in Charlottesville.*

September and the following months, and it has developed into a real war. There are also numerous people who have found out that, while Hitler is having his "lightning war" (*blitzkrieg*), Mussolini is having his "thunder war." But I would not be surprised if at some moment, in a few days, his war, too, will develop into a real one. I think the fact that he chose the date June 10 has several explanations.

MR. UTLEY: And they are?

MR. BORGESE: One has already been pointed out: that he wanted to be there before the fall of Paris. On the other hand, do you remember, Utley, what happened on the 10th of June in 1924?

MR. UTLEY: No, I don't.

MR. BORGESE: Don't you remember the Italian Socialist deputy, who was famous immediately after his death—Matteotti?[2]

MR. UTLEY: Oh, sure! Matteotti, the labor leader who was killed.

MR. BORGESE: He was killed with the passive or active connivance of Mussolini, and this happened on the 10th of June. Since that year, this date has always been considered by Italian anti-Fascists—secretly in Italy, and openly abroad—as a date for commemoration and resurrection. Now I would not at all be surprised—knowing some of the workings of Mussolini's mind—if he had wanted to submerge the shame and disdain and the remorse in the, supposed, glory of the declaration of war.

MR. UTLEY: I see. From now on, June 10 becomes the date upon which Italy went into the war and marched to glory, or what-

[2] *Giacomo Matteotti was a Socialist member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He was kidnapped June 10, 1924, and several prominent Fascists were arrested for the crime. On June 13 his body was found near Rome and a connection between the crime and the government was suggested by many.*

ever it is, and is no longer thought of in Italy as the date on which Matteotti was murdered. The bigger event of the declaration of war submerges the old murder.

MR. BORGESE: Exactly so!

MR. HALPERIN: That is all very interesting, but let us not underestimate the importance of the strategic considerations and the status of the military operations in France at that particular moment.

MR. UTLEY: I'll agree, and I don't think Borgese was suggesting that June 10 was chosen simply because of the Matteotti murder. Having decided to go in, indeed having felt that it was necessary for Italy in her national interest to go in about now, there were other reasons for picking June 10 as the exact date. Isn't that your point, Borgese?

MR. BORGESE: He might have chosen the 8th or the 9th or the 12th.

MR. HALPERIN: To extract whatever moral advantages he could from that particular coincidence, he chose June 10.

MR. UTLEY: In the larger sense, he went in at this time because, first, as a weak country he did not feel that he dared go in until he was quite sure the Germans were going to win. Second—as Borgese has correctly pointed out—if he were going to go in, he could not hope to get any gratitude from the Germans if he went in after they had taken Paris. There is no glory, no gratitude, no anything in that. So he was more or less in a strait-jacket about coming in.

But now—not looking at her entry as a matter of time, but in a larger sense—why has Italy gone into this war? What are her basic motives?

MR. HALPERIN: Of course there are a number of considerations. Among them, of course, are her long-standing imperial

aims. I think we might spend a moment or two discussing some these claims to territory which Italy has advanced from time to ne with great vociferousness.

MR. UTLEY: I've heard claims at various times to Nice, voy, Tunis, the rich African colony of France right across from aly, and to Corsica.

MR. BORGESE: These are very recent claims.

MR. UTLEY: They are not the claims the Italians have always put forward, based on the Treaty of 1915?[3]

MR. BORGESE: No.

MR. HALPERIN: The Treaty of London in 1915 provided, among other things, that in the event that France and Britain would increase their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, Italy would be entitled to claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya, and the neighboring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain. Of course the Italians have always emphasized the point of equitable compensation, and have pointed out that Britain and France did acquire the German colonies in Africa; whereas Italy, they insist, did not receive equitable or equivalent compensation.

MR. UTLEY: But you now say, Borgese, that, despite the Treaty of London between the Allies and Italy in 1915—the secret treaty where all these things were promised—the Italians did not actually make much point about the colonial situation in the peace settlement.

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[3] *The secret agreement between Italy and the Allies known as the "Treaty of London" was signed April 26, 1915; on May 23 Italy formally declared war on Austria-Hungary, though a similar declaration was not made against Germany until August 28, 1916.*

MR. BORGESE: No, very little. All their attention was concentrated on the problem of the so-called *Irridenta*. That is, of the Italians who were out of the Italian boundaries, and especially on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea in Dalmatia. Italy got some of the things that were promised in the Treaty of London. She did not get much of the Dalmatian coast that she had wanted, but she obtained some things that were not in the Treaty of London. For instance, Fiume was explicitly out of it. The lamentations about the ill-treatment by the Allies certainly are not substantiated by the reality of events.[4]

MR. HALPERIN: And I would like to add that the Italians have stated time and time again that they have been shamefully mistreated by the Allies in the matter of colonial territory. The fact of the matter is that on three occasions since the last war—in 1919, in 1924, and in 1935—Italy was granted new territories in Africa. And, as a matter of fact, in 1935—at the time of the Rome Accords—Italy professed herself satisfied with the colonial settlement arrived at in that year. It was only three years later (in 1938) that she began to revive openly the colonial question and began talking about Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and other objectives.

MR. UTLEY: Then, in effect, you both believe that the Italian claims, based on colonial issues, in recent years have been propaganda materials, primarily used for the purpose of influencing international public opinion; that, basically, Mussolini is conducting a new imperial drive; that he is out for all he can get, and wherever he can get it; and that Italy, having faced toward the course of empire, uses these colonial claims merely as propaganda machinery.

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[4] *Fiume was annexed by Italy in 1924, after a long and bitter quarrel with Yugoslavia, during which the city was seized by an "unofficial" troop of soldiers organized by Gabriel d'Annunzio, well-known Italian poet and soldier. This Italian seizure was recognized by Yugoslavia in a treaty signed April 5, 1925.*

FASCIST DREAMS OF EMPIRE
1940

MR. HALPERIN: I would certainly agree with that. I would certainly say that Italy has been advancing claims which she knows she may not achieve immediately but which she has been advancing for the purpose of strengthening her strategic and bargaining position; and, of course, always with the idea of influencing internal public opinion.

MR. BORGESE: No single country that fought the first World War came out of it satisfied with the reparations. Let us not forget that the French super-patriots wanted the Rhine Bank (they did not get it), and that, on the whole, Italy was the most victorious of the nations that participated in that war. She got not only a com-

plete national unity but she got the best military frontier of any country in Europe.

MR. UTLEY: What was that?

MR. BORGESE: The Alpine circle which runs completely around the whole peninsula and the Mediterranean, plus the complete destruction of her hereditary enemy, Austria-Hungary.

MR. UTLEY: Indeed, Italy was the only nation that did obtain complete destruction of her enemy.

MR. BORGESE: Absolutely so! So Italy could very well have developed a superiority complex as the one really victorious nation; and if the contrary happened, it happened due, especially, to emotional motives. That is, the rise of the idea of world supremacy, of a Roman Empire, and the rise of the fascist ideology—which we should not forget is a product of the Italian mind. After all, it arose in Italy in 1919, then expanded to Germany, and now, alas! to much of the world.[5]

MR. UTLEY: Can I ask you, as an American citizen, but, after all, as one who has spent much of his life in Italy, and originally as an Italian citizen, whether this fascist mentality has, in your opinion, carried the Italian people with it? Whether the Italian people today, in your opinion, support this war against France and the Allies?

MR. BORGESE: The intelligentsia has been corrupted for centuries by this complex of inferiority-superiority, of primacy and complaint. But concerning the general mass of the Italian people

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[5] *The original Fascisti (or Black Shirts) were a group of ex-soldiers organized March 23, 1919, into an anti-Socialist, anti-Communist association by Benito Mussolini; the new group grew in numbers and power until after the general strike in the summer of 1922 it marched (October 24, 1922) on Rome and seized power in a bloodless coup d'etat.*

may be that your opinion is correct, according to which they ould not have wanted any Roman Empire or any war. The final ruth about this situation was expressed by an American journalist, hose name I forget. I read his correspondence in a provincial pa- er about two months ago. He said: "It may be true that the Ital- ns are not against the war; it may be true that if they had a Gallup oll in the Swift or Armour pen at the Chicago Stockyards, 84.6% would say 'We don't want,' 10.3% would say 'We don't know,' and .1% would say 'We want'; but when the moment comes and the whip cracks, they shuffle up the ramp and they go just the same as laughtered stock."

MR. HALPERIN: There's another point that ought to be kept n mind, and that is the personal prestige and influence of Mussolini within Italy. I think that is very high, and I think it is very signifi- ant. I think it is probably true that the bulk of the Italian people were not particularly enthusiastic about going into this war, and ertainly were not particularly friendly to the Germans as such; but think that Mussolini's prestige and popularity and infallibility are so great in Italy that when he gives the word, and when he says "Now we will march!" the Italian people believe—from past experi- ence—that the end will be successful.

MR. UTLEY: You see painted over all the walls of Italy "Mussolini is always right!" Do you think that carries conviction?

MR. BORGESE: That is painted on all the walls by Mussolini himself and it may be very true what Halperin says. I do not deny that there are chances that Halperin is a better expert on Italian things than I since he has been there recently and I have not been there for nine years. But, as far as my experience and what I know is concerned, I think that the real prestige of Mussolini, the real popularity of Mussolini, lies in the fact that he disposes of all the armed force, of all the police, and of all the machine guns, so that the Italians are the steers that shuffle up the ramp to the slaughtering blocks.

MR. HALPERIN: You spoke of propaganda agencies. When you say they are steers, you say they are so completely indoctrinated with the notions of fascism that they follow blindly, so it is ideologies and moral mentalities that have been effectively employed.

MR. UTLEY: After all, if somebody cracks a whip behind you, that isn't indoctrination, and yet it works. But I am impressed myself—and I always have been as I have taken my car year after year and driven through Italy, from Naples to the Brenner Pass—that in every town—half a dozen times in a town of any size; a hundred times in larger towns—you see these signs: "Mussolini is always right!" In many ways he has been right. They all said he could not get away with Ethiopia, and he did.[6] The idea of success always brings compensation.

MR. HALPERIN: Nothing succeeds like success.

MR. BORGESE: Which means he had measured the stupidity of the western democracies. That is, he knew they would not resist.

MR. UTLEY: And he knew he could bet on that again with his declaration this last Monday. Italy is not a country that can ever fight a real war. After all, Italy has hardly any coal (and what little she has is inferior); with no petroleum; no copper to speak of; no cotton, rubber, nickel, chromite, or tungsten—not much of any of those things that are so necessary in war. She has only a third

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[6] *Italy's conflict with Ethiopia (Abyssinia) began as a border clash in December, 1934; Italian troops invaded the country in the fall of 1935 and occupied Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, on May 5, 1936. The country was formally annexed May 9, 1936, and King Victor Emmanuel III was proclaimed Emperor of Ethiopia; on June 1, 1936, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland were joined with Ethiopia in the new area known as Italian East Africa.*

ough iron or steel, which you must have for tanks, and shortages all sorts of other fundamental raw materials, which a couple of rs ago caused a professor of a German war college to say that aly suffers more severely from the shortage of raw materials than y other big power in Europe."[7] A country like that cannot really pe to last in a war very long.[8]

MR. HALPERIN: Not in a long war, of course. You must remember, too, that Italy has been stocking up very definitely in all these essential war supplies and has on hand, unquestionably, ough material of that type to engage in a *blitzkrieg* for several onths. Don't you agree, Borgese?

MR. BORGESE: They have not prepared enough for a long ar . . . .

MR. HALPERIN: In cotton, rubber, and all the rest.

MR. BORGESE: . . . . but perhaps for a short war, a *blitzkrieg*, hich, by the way, was invented by an Italian general.

MR. UTLEY: Who was he?

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[7] *Professor Colonel Xylander, writing in "Die Kriegswirtschaftliche Verfassung Italiens," published five years ago in Hamburg.*

[8] *For an estimate of Italy's capacity to supply herself with important raw materials, prepared by the German Institute for Economic Research, see page 12.*

Werner (see Suggested Readings, page 23), lists nitrate, zinc, and aluminum as the only materials Italy can obtain in sufficient or nearly sufficient quantities. Coal imports (amounting to twelve to fourteen million tons per year) came largely via water from Germany. Coal must now come, if at all, by land, taxing transportation facilities. Oil requirements are estimated at around twenty million barrels annually. While some oil is available in Albania, this amounts to not more than one million barrels per year, the remainder coming mainly from the western hemisphere, particularly the United States, Mexico, and Venezuela, with a small amount obtained from Rumania.



MR. BORGESE: General Douhet. Douhet, in 1921, wrote a book that became a classic in Italy and in Germany concerning aerial warfare and the lightning war.[9] So they have prepared for a

[9] *Of Douhet, Werner says: "The theory of the supremacy of the air arm originates in Italy, where it was first put forward by General Douhet. Although official Italian strategy has not adopted this theory completely, Italy's greatest efforts are devoted to the air arm."*

ort war, and the western democracies have allowed them to pick the materials.

MR. UTLEY: In a long war, the fact that Italy—a nation of out forty-three million—is mainly an agricultural country,[10] with neyards, and cultivating olive orchards, corn, oats, potatoes, and ings of that sort, with only a rather weak industrial establishnt,[11] would make a big difference and would doom her to defeat. t in a short war, where she hopes for victory in a few months by *tzkrieg* tactics, these things don't make any difference. Nor does make much difference that about seventy per cent of Italy's forn commerce has to come in through Gibraltar and Suez.[12]

MR. BORGESE: That's all right, and it's what the economic ind says is important, yet, as I have quoted one American jourlist, I will quote another. Wallace Deuel, cabling yesterday from e occupied areas in France where he is with the German army, rites:

> Many of the civilians have been told for seven years that the Germans were hungry; that their clothes were made of paper; that they had no gasoline and no rubber; that their tanks were made of cardboard; that their motorized mate-

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[10] *The census of 1936 gave Italy a population of nearly 43,000,000. f those over ten years of age, nearly half are engaged in agriculture. or acreage devoted to important crops, see page 15.*

[11] *The statistics of the Fascist Confederation of Industrialists, as reorted by the United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, how Italian industrial concerns employ 3,595,000 workers, with an additional 230,000 in small-craft shops. Of these workers, 1,500,000 are mployed in the 1,153 large plants (those employing over 250 workers), with 43 per cent of these large plants in the northern industrial section of Italy.*

[12] *About four-fifths of Italy's foreign trade is sea-borne. All but hirteen per cent of this trade comes through Gibraltar and Suez.*

rial would not run, etc., etc., and now to their unspeakable amazement they have found that everything was all right with the German army.

MR. HALPERIN: That was wishful thinking with a vengeance, wasn't it?

MR. BORGESE: I would not be surprised if something of the kind would occur with respect to Italy, even if the war had to last a few weeks or a few months longer than was anticipated.

MR. UTLEY: Borgese, you took the position—implicitly, at least—that from the very start Italy was in a way destined to come in on the side of Germany; that the matter of the date might depend upon how the battles went on, but that the two great fascisms (you referred to Italy as the basic cradle of fascism and said it had spread to Germany) must march together.

I would like to dispute that just for a moment along these lines: In the event that Germany had not broken through on the western front, in the event that the picture in the west—on the Franco-German front—was today what it was two months ago, I don't believe for a minute that Italy would ever have come in. It seems to me that she came in only, as the *New York Times*, I think, correctly put it in an editorial the other day, "with the courage of a jackal following in the footsteps of a bolder beast of prey." When they thought that Germany had lamed the opponents of Germany, then Italy would come in to take part in the kill.

MR. BORGESE: I would never for a moment suppose that fascist Italy would have gone into the war if Germany had undergone a very serious defeat or shock. That the intervention was timed to Germany's success is beyond doubt, but I do not think at all that there was any moment in which Mussolini thought of intervention on the other side or of permanent neutrality . . . .

MR. HALPERIN: That's true!

EXTENT OF ITALIAN AGRICULTURE 1937



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 1 MILLION ACRES

MR. BORGESE: . . . . because the two principles—the two ideals of life, if we may call them that—are strictly tied together, and if naziism fell, fascism would fall, too.

MR. HALPERIN: It seems to me that you cannot overlook the importance of the fact that the record of Mussolini clearly indicates that he has always been an opportunist; that he has always made

the most of momentary situations which he can exploit to his greatest advantage; and that after September, 1939—as Utley points out—he has been carefully weighing the total situation, trying to figure out just what might happen, and gauging his own policies and his own point of view accordingly.

MR. BORGESE: He is more consistent than you suppose. He was at first a revolutionary communist; then he became a revolutionary fascist; but always a revolutionist, and always a subverter. When the movement that he created (because he was the father of fascism) became such a world issue (his theory of destruction of the other inhabitants of the world was almost like a religious upheaval)—at that moment he became even too small compared with the movement that he had created and with which he had to follow through.[13]

MR. HALPERIN: He was always an opportunist as well. His ideological about-faces, passes, and somersaults amply testified to the fact that ideological consistencies never were an obstacle to Mussolini.

MR. BORGESE: No, there were never ideological somersaults, except from destructive Marxism. . . . .

MR. HALPERIN: Republicanism, Marxism, socialism, fascism —those certainly indicate somersaults, I should think.

MR. UTLEY: As I gather, Halperin, you think that Mussolini is first and foremost an imperialist, out to create a new Roman Empire, to aggrandize his country by whatever means he can.

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[13] *Benito Mussolini, now 57, has been head of the Italian state for eighteen years. Before the war he was an active leftist leader and socialist journalist. He was jailed in 1911 because of his opposition to the Italian campaign against Tripoli. When the first World War broke out, Mussolini took a strong interventionist position and volunteered in 1915 when Italy finally entered the conflict. After the war he organized his fascist groups, and seized power in 1922.*

MR. BORGESE: Himself!

MR. UTLEY: Yes, and to do that he uses propaganda, militism, ideologies—yes, but the ideology is subordinate to his constant opportunism, to what is best for *him* at a given moment.

MR. HALPERIN: And for his regime at any given moment.

MR. UTLEY: At the start of the war Mussolini likely had in mind entering the war, as he has done, if these events took place in the war; but, on the contrary, had the French held their own very well he would have stayed out and—it is somewhat harder to imagine—had the French been distinctly winning the war so that an Allied victory looked as likely as a German victory, Mussolini might have turned around and come in on the Allied side.

MR. HALPERIN: No, I don't think he would have come in on the Allied side at all. I think that is pretty definitely out of the question. But I do think he might have exploited his nuisance value even to the Allies that were winning the war, to extract diplomatic and territorial concessions which they might have given him in order that the war might be shortened and that a victory over Germany might be more sure.

MR. BORGESE: Nobody wants to enter a war, not even if he is not a jackal, if his destiny is manifest and he is alive.

MR. HALPERIN: Yes, in that respect he is a realist and an opportunist.

MR. UTLEY: In other words, Halperin, he is an opportunist first, last, and all the time to you. To you, Borgese, he is a man who is controlled by ideologies which you say have gotten too big for him, perhaps.

MR. BORGESE: It has gotten too big for him and he cannot control Italy in war.

MR. HALPERIN: And, therefore, he is a slave to his ideology? I certainly would not agree with that.

MR. UTLEY: Gentlemen, I think we can see your two points of view. You just disagree, and I don't think you are likely to agree in the next six hours. So let's turn our attention now to what Italy may actually do in the war. She has about a million and a half men, I think. In the way of soldiers, sixty to seventy divisions; three or four so-called "Celere" or fast armoured divisions; but, in general, Italy is supposed to have not too strong an army.[14]

MR. HALPERIN: I would like to say a word about that if I may.

MR. UTLEY: Go ahead.

MR. HALPERIN: I was in Rome at the time of Marconi's death.[15] A considerable number of Italian soldiers participated in that procession. They were not particularly impressive to look at. They marched out of step, their clothing was rather shabby, and their manner was anything but martial. But I think it would be rather rash to deduce from that that the Italian soldier is inferior. I think, as a matter of fact, if they are given an ample opportunity in this war they may give a very good account of themselves.

MR. BORGESE: That is, if they win the first battle—supposing there are battles—they will be excellent. We should never forget, when we make discriminations between armies, that 650,000 of the

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[14] *Hanson Baldwin, military writer for the "New York Times," states: ". . . . 1,250,000 to 1,500,000 white troops . . . . their quality spotty, their equipment the same." Mussolini's claims to be able to mobilize eight million men are not treated seriously by military observers.*

[15] *In 1937.*

BOMBERS OVER AFRICA



thers of those soldiers whom you saw had died in the first World r, and that they might die tomorrow.[16]

MR. HALPERIN: And we must remember what the military erts said about the Ethiopian War. A great many of them pre-

[16] *Out of 42 months of fighting in the World War, Italy emerged h a casualty list higher, proportionately, than the losses of the British pire: 650,000 men were killed or died from wounds or disease; ,000 were wounded, 220,000 of these being permanently disabled;),000 were taken prisoner or reported missing.*

dicted that Italy would never be able to conquer Ethiopia becaus of the terrain and the climate. Of course, we all know the outcom of that enterprise.

MR. UTLEY: I take it from what has been said earlier tha you still do not think that Italy's main function in this war is t launch a major land campaign against France. Do you then, Bor gese, foresee that Italy's major function is to use her navy—which is after all, only a half to a third the size of the British fleet—mainly to bring about a decision in some way?[17]

MR. BORGESE: I am no technical prophet, but I think that i the main possibility today. About the proportions of the British and Italian navies, you are speaking of the whole of the British navy whereas the attack should be on the British-French navy as concentrated in the Mediterranean. I suppose that the plan is to make of the Mediterranean a trap in order to sink or to capture the British-French navy.

MR. HALPERIN: And if the French are quickly knocked out, of course, it leaves only the British navy to face the job of patrolling the Mediterranean, the North Sea and the Atlantic, and, of course, the question of Gibraltar would thereupon become very important.

MR. BORGESE: The task of Spain is to control Gibraltar.

MR. HALPERIN: And, of course, we have noted Spain's change of status from that of neutral to a non-belligerent. We know, too, that Italian and German military missions have been stationed

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[17] *Before the outbreak of the war last September, Italy's naval strength was estimated at 718,000 tons, as compared with 2,080,000 tons in the British and 755,000 tons in the French navies. All of the strength of the Allies is not concentrated in the Mediterranean area where the Italian navy will probably fight. Italy has concentrated heavily on light naval equipment, and is estimated to have 120 torpedo boats and 180 submarines.*

-pain and that German engineers are supervising the construc-
n of fortifications along the Spanish-French frontier. And, of
se, there is the possibility of using Spanish air bases for Italian
es. All of that points a very gloomy picture if Spain's role be-
mes even more active.

MR. BORGESE: Obviously, when Germany and Italy took
of Spain in the civil war, which started in 1936, they did not
e in mind just taking hold of Spain, but using Spain as a base
ttacks against France and England first, and against America
r—with God or Satan's help. When Balbo came to Chicago in
3, and the splendid boulevard in the city was dedicated to his
y, his real purpose was not a goodwill trip, as candid people in-
reted it, but to show to themselves and to the others that a large
force could cross the oceans.[18]

MR. UTLEY: I agree with much of what you've said; but I'd
to look for a moment at the consequences to the United States.
first and most obvious: we lose one hundred million dollars in
le which we had with the Italians last year.[19] Second, certain of
special industries—oil exports, and others—lose particularly
erely. I suppose there are certain consequences for the Italian-
erican group in this country, aren't there, Borgese?

MR. BORGESE: Certainly! I do not stand for them all, and
ve read what has happened concerning the Italian Consulate in

---

[18] *Marshal Italo Balbo and a force of 24 planes made a several-stop to the United States in 1933 which ended in Chicago July 15.*

[19] *Approximately sixty million dollars worth of goods sold to Italy approximately forty millions imported from Italy. In the first ee months of 1940 the exports to Italy totalled 28,000,000 dollars; ports, 9,000,000 dollars. Italian dollar bonds held in this country ount to some 120,000,000 dollars (aside from government debts to United States government, amounting to some two billion dollars, w in default.)*

New York and other groups engaged in propaganda and conspiracy. I know how many of these poor people have been misguided by tremendous propaganda. I would, though, insist on the fact that not every Italian, not every Italo-American, should be considered as a man holding his dagger in his hand, and that watchfulness should not degenerate into hysteria, although watchfulness must be very severe.

MR. HALPERIN: Excellent!

MR. UTLEY: I agree, but perhaps the most fundamental consequence for this country is that it has revolutionized our foreign policy. A week ago Wednesday our Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 19 to 2 against the Pepper resolution to supply army airplanes and other things to the Allies. After Italy came into the war Mr. Roosevelt spoke at Charlottesville, and on Tuesday, June 11, the Senate voted 68 to 18 to supply airplanes to the Allies.

We have left the field of neutrality; we have gone over to open partiality. Italy has gone from non-belligerency to belligerency; we have gone from neutrality to non-belligerency.

SUGGESTED READINGS

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Italy, a Gambler's Choice," *Business Week*, May 25, 1940. *A ief summary of the economic factors involved in Italy's going to ar, with some speculation on her ability to last through a long war.*

DMAN, R. A., "France and Italy," *Contemporary Review*, May, 940. *An examination of Franco-Italian relations, past, present, nd future.*

VASI, FRANK, "When Mussolini Steps Down," *Colliers*, May 5, 1940. *The problem of succession in the Italian dictatorship ith a special discussion of Count Ciano and fascist party secretary, ttore Muti.*

RNER, MAX, *Military Strength of the Powers.* New York: Modrn Age Books, 1939. *Chapter 10 of this volume discusses Italy as a nilitary factor in contemporary Europe, evaluating her economic osition, air, land, and naval forces, and her role in any war against he western powers.*

LFE, HENRY C., "Italy's Theater of War," *Current History*, une, 1940. *Italy's geography and the strategic plan Mussolini has nuilt for war in the west.*

OLBERT, ROBERT GALE, "Italy's Role in the European Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 1, 1930. *A general survey of Italy's position in the present war, with some attention to the development of Italian foreign policy since the fascist revolution in 1922.*

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. What event on June 10, 1924, may have influenced Mussolini to choose that date this year for the declaration of war against the Allies? Page 3.
2. Name three French possessions demanded by Italy. Page 5.
3. What promises were made to Italy in the "Treaty of London" in 1915 regarding post-war spoils? Page 5.
4. What hereditary enemy of Italy was destroyed in the first World War? Page 8.
5. List some of the strategic raw materials Italy lacks. Page 10.
6. What is the relationship of General Douhet to the idea of the lightning war? Pages 11–12.
7. The largest part of Italy's population is engaged in what occupation? How would this affect the prosecution of a modern war? Page 13.
8. Approximately what share of Italy's foreign trade comes through Gibraltar and Suez? Page 13.
9. What is the estimated size of Italy's army? Page 18.
10. How do the Italian and British fleets compare in size? Page 20.
11. What was the amount of Italo-American trade in 1939? Page 21.
12. What action by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicates a shift in American opinion brought about by Italy's entrance into the war and by recent events in France? Page 22.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 23.

*

Summarize the argument that Mussolini entered the war as an opportunist. Discuss the argument that Italy was in fact in the war from its beginning last fall and that ideological considerations were the primary motivation behind Italian declaration of war June 10.

Comment on the quotation: "Italy suffers more severely from the shortage of raw materials than any other big power in Europe." Do you think Italy would be economically unable to continue a first-class war for longer than six months?

Italian industry is not as well developed as German, French, or British industry. How will this fact affect the prosecution of a long war? Do you think the lack of raw materials or the undeveloped industrial system the more important factor here? Or are they equally important? Discuss.

How would you summarize Italian aims? What geographical areas may be added to the Italian Empire? What "spheres of influence" may be established? What economic gains may result?

How do you believe Italy's declaration of war will affect America?

How would you evaluate the Italian army, navy, and air force? What particular military tasks do you think each of these forces will undertake in the prosecution of the war?

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain sidelights on the subje matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters receiv following the broadcast June 9, "Have We Time to Think?"*

*

Put Out the Fire

Who cares a damn what is in a house, when a fire is coming toward it? Who cares whether the firemen realize that they are fighting to save an extra precious chunk of civilization? All we want is plenty of apparatus, plenty of water, plenty of pressure and efficient supervising of the fight. After the fire is out we can finger Aristotle once more and meditate on the nimbus painted in around grandpop's head and shoulders. But first, *Put out the fire.*

K. R. H., New York

*

Ill

We are with Mr. Kaltenborn 100 per cent and wish him to know we consider every word he said absolutely right, and as for the rest of the talk, it really made us ill. It is not for us to question the working of the intellectual minds, but being teachers ourselves, we may be able to judge in a somewhat feeble way, as it were. And our conclusions are that only one question confronts us today: How to get quick, complete aid to the Allies. General Pershing said: "The Alli are not our first line of defense—bu our last."

W. F. P., Oregon

*

Values

It seemed to me one of the mos intensely interesting discussions I hav heard. I am inclined to agree mos nearly, perhaps, with Mr. Clifto Fadiman, who held that an efficient awakened preparation upon the par of America, while of first importanc just now, is *not* incompatible wit some sane thinking at the same time as to *what kind of values* we propos to defend to the uttermost. It seem to me the present turmoil of the worl may in large part be laid to the *ver fact* that in the *first* world war, ideal of humanity and justice and commo sense were allowed to be so *entirel* overgrown, during the serious busi ness of winning the war, that th places where they should have bee kept growing were choked wit weeds of hatred, revenge, and fear.

C. E. N., Connecticut

...ce a Rest

...Will you allow an admirer and ...wisher to advise you [Mr. Kalten...n], strongly, to take a rest? I ...ned to the University of Chicago ...ND TABLE yesterday, and it was ...first time in years that I have ...wn you to lose your poise. You ...e, in fact, a perfect illustration of ...t your opponents were contend...would happen to people were they ...llow the advice you were giving!

M. C. H., New York

*

...ought Provoking

...These discussions are the most ...ught-provoking features on the ... I usually conclude this period ... the conviction that so far the ...es of right thinking motivate the ...er brain of our ablest educational ...lers.

...Poor Kaltenborn this A.M.! He ... took a beating as did everyone ... who puts his faith in a rabbit-... charm. If America adopts [his] ... and reacts to it, we will become ... another nation of nazis at heart ... head—though of course we'll ...se another name for ourselves!

P. L., Oregon

*

...t in Front

...The country needs more such bal...ed discussions to restrain the over...ous (though entirely honest) citi...s from abandoning civilization in ...r eagerness to save it. It should be made plain that teachers are awake and have been predicting this holocaust for years—generations—but have not had any audience. Now the audience has caught the teachers, passed them, and is away out in front —going it knows not where—shouting "Come on! Wake up!"

R. B. D., Pennsylvania

*

Fundamental Truths

I am a housewife. I have just finished listening to your discussion over the radio on "Do we have time to think?" I arrived from church just in time to turn it on. It aroused *me* very much to the great need of arousing the *people*—the great majority—to action and constructive thinking.

The thinking *must* come along with the action which is imperative!

As I sat here I saw several of my neighbors in this apartment building outdoors concerned with nothing but pleasure. I thought of conversations I have had with these neighbors. They know *nothing* of the realities of life. They read headlines, happen to hear snatches of radio talk about the monstrosities of Hitler and what should happen to him—surface things, smart things, popular thoughts—never any deep considerations of fundamental *truths*. Democracy, principles of right living, what do they mean? They aren't concerned with it. If they are aroused to war it will be from a sense of self-preservation or fear of loss of possessions or business.

We *need* this education of *ideals* of democracy. We need to save our

country—yes—and aroused action is urgent, but we must know *why!* The people *cannot* be aroused enough to save our country and civilization, if they are not aroused to fight for *principles!* How can they be awakened, is what I want to know! Your programs are helping a lot and I want to express my appreciation of them. I've heard it said we need another great leader. Well, teaching people t do independent, constructive thinkin is going to make a great country o leaders and doers.

But the bridge playing, party go ing crowds I am familiar with woul not know what to do with an evenin —even thirty minutes—of intelligen conversation.

B. G., Missouri

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83. *International Law—What Is It?*
84. *The Economic War*
85. *What's the War All About?*
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93. *When Tomorrow Comes*
94. *1939: Crisis Year*

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95. *Wages and Hours in the North and South*
96. *Is Our War News Accurate?*
97. *The Far East—Backdoor War?*
98. *The Jews*
99. *Economic War Between the States*
100. *Is Russia Losing in Finland?*
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109. *Scandinavia on the Spot*
110. *Third Term?*
111. *Where's that War Boom?*
112. *The Trojan Horse*
113. *Blitzkrieg, May, 1940*
114. *America and the Peacemongers*
115. *Babies Cost Money*
116. *If Germany Wins*
117. *Have We Time to Think?* June 9

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JUNE 23, 1940

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(THIRD PARTICIPANT TO BE ANNOUNCED)

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